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What is free will? Free will is the 
idea that we make choices and have 
thoughts independent of anything 
remotely resembling a physical 
process. Free will is the close cousin 
to the idea of the soul — the concept 
that ‘you’, your thoughts and feelings, 
derive from an entity that is separate 
and distinct from the physical 
mechanisms that make up your body. 
From this perspective, your choices 
are not caused by physical events, but 
instead emerge wholly formed from 
somewhere indescribable and outside 
the purview of physical descriptions. 
This implies that free will cannot have 
evolved by natural selection, as that 
would place it directly in a stream of 
causally connected physical events. 
Consequently, the idea of free will is 
not even in principle within reach of 
scientific description.
If free will is not a useful scientific 
concept, then how can we address 
the biological substrates of choice? 
Instead of getting hung up on the 
semantics of defining free will, modern 
biological approaches to the problem of 
choice have directed their efforts toward 
understanding how nervous systems: 
(1) frame the finite choices available; 
(2) value the choices; and (3) choose 
an option based on those valuations. 
This is a very economic rendering of 
the problem, but the problem of choice 
for biologically evolved creatures is 
exactly an economic problem. Viewed 
this way, it’s easy to see why ‘free’ 
choice is an unconstructive way to 
conceptualize the way humans choose. 
Real-world creatures operate on finite 
energetic resources and so they are 
never free to choose from an infinite 
reserve of possibilities. Moreover, even 
among the finite choices available, 
some choices are much better than 
others. Imagine the creature that, 
upon detecting a fierce predator, has 
a nervous system that chooses to run 
straight at the predator. This kind of 
mechanism doesn’t last very long in the 
real world, and therefore we don’t see 
good examples of such ‘non-escape’ 
behavior in creatures today.
Quick guide Much of the best biological work in decision-making has been carried out 
in bacteria and insects because the 
genetics of these organisms is better 
understood and they provide the most 
physically accessible nervous systems. 
With the advent of modern imaging 
and neurophysiological techniques, 
however, decision-making by human 
and non-human primates has become 
a bustling area in the early stages of 
development. This work has focused 
largely on the important problem of 
valuation — the way that nervous 
systems assign differential value to 
available behavioral options. And it’s 
this valuation step that appears to 
provide human decision-makers with 
an especially developed capacity — the 
ability to use abstract ideas to control 
our behavior. It is this capacity that 
resembles, but is not equivalent to, the 
older ideas about will.
Is there any mechanism or capacity 
in the human nervous system that 
resembles will? It’s well known that 
abstract ideas can commandeer a 
person’s behavior and often in odd 
ways. For example, humans routinely 
go on hunger strikes based on political 
ideas and can inhibit their drive to take 
in food — even to the point of death. 
The capacity for abstractions to veto 
survival instincts can be seemingly 
arbitrary and the abstraction does even 
not have to possess any basis in reality. 
One need only remember the 1997 
mass suicide of the Heaven’s Gate cult 
based on the idea that there was a 
spaceship hiding in the tail of the comet 
Hale-Bopp waiting to take believers ‘to 
the next level’. 
The ability to make choices 
inconsistent with survival is a potent 
ability to choose and one that brings 
potential physical danger to its 
possessor.
Does the capacity to make 
choices inconsistent with survival 
demonstrate that humans possess 
something like free choice? The 
dramatic examples above appear 
on the surface to resemble the old 
philosophical idea of free will —  
choosing a course of action against 
all biological imperatives. As we 
illustrated above, humans do not 
possess the traditional notion of free 
choice; however, they do possess a 
capacity for flexible choice. One way 
to understand this flexibility is by 
hypothesizing that these ‘pathologies’ of choice represent extremes in the 
normal human capacity for cognitive 
innovation — the ability to form and 
pursue novel ideas not directly related 
to immediate survival needs. 
As biological creatures, we are 
intimately tied to the demands for 
our survival — breathing, eating, 
procreating, avoiding trouble, and so 
on. Cognitive innovation requires (at 
least) a kind of timeout from these 
demands, as well as elevation of the 
value assigned to the innovation, 
that is, the new idea or behavior. 
To pursue some idea not directly 
related to survival our brains would 
need mechanisms to turn down the 
importance of survival needs and 
turn up the value of the idea. This 
hypothesis makes an important point. 
Our choices never were free, but they 
remain rather flexible and they do so 
by allowing abstractions to be able 
to commandeer our attention and 
behavior — at least temporarily. This 
capacity provides one direct conduit 
from the culture that we build and 
further allows this culture to couple 
rather tightly to our behavior. This is 
a biological process that we do not 
understand, but it exposes all sorts 
of important ramifications for our 
treasured social institutions —  
schools, laws, government, and so on. 
Are there practical ways in which 
valuation mechanisms change a 
human’s capacity to choose? Yes. 
Consider drug addiction (choose any 
drug). Modern biological approaches 
to drug addiction have attacked 
the problem at numerous levels of 
description. We now understand a 
great deal about the neuroanatomy, 
neurophysiology, and molecular 
interactions that are influenced by 
drugs of abuse. Over the last 15 years, 
however, computational descriptions of 
reward processing systems have added 
another perspective to this literature. 
These models have identified reward-
prediction error signals encoded in 
fluctuations in dopaminergic neuron 
activity in the midbrain. Midbrain 
dopamine systems are hijacked or 
perturbed by every drug of abuse and 
these systems are intimately tied to 
the way that the mammalian nervous 
system values choices available to it. 
Such models portray addiction as 
valuation disease, where the nervous 
system over-values cues associated 
with drugs or drug-taking. However, 
there is a point here: the addicted 
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flee, Gunther and his stepmother were 
the last of the family to go, making a 
narrow escape on foot into Belgium on 
New Year’s Eve 1938, after a harrowing 
encounter with German border guards. 
While his father and brother 
remained in England, Gunther came 
alone to America in March, 1940 
to live in Chicago with his sister 
Claire and her husband Robert 
Hines. Having graduated from Hyde 
Park School in 1942 after only two 
years study, Gunther attended the 
University of Illinois, Champaign-
Urbana on scholarship, supplemented 
by work as a soda jerk/short order 
cook at the local drugstore and by 
reduced membership fees at the Tau 
Epsilon Phi fraternity, which needed 
to raise its academic standing. His 
fascination with railroads and steam 
engines led to an honors degree in 
physical chemistry; a second major in 
philosophy reflected his passionate, 
life-long interest in that field. Gunther 
graduated in December 1944 after only 
29 months as an undergraduate and 
became an American citizen in 1945.
At the encouragement of his 
undergraduate thesis mentor, Frederick 
Wall, Gunther enrolled in graduate 
school at Illinois and became involved 
in the synthetic rubber research 
program conducted for the War 
Development Board. The task was 
to find ways to correct for the elastic 
defects in synthetic rubber caused by 
the heterogeneity in the chain length 
of the molecules. Gunther published 
two papers but his efforts were largely 
superceded by the end of the war. He 
defended his dissertation in 1948 at the 
age of 24. 
He interrupted his graduate study to 
serve eight months (1946–1947) in the 
Interallied Field Information Agency, 
Technical (FIAT), nominally assessing 
scientific and technical innovations 
in German industry. Gunther found 
this effort useless, but it did generate 
free time and the credentials to travel 
in postwar Germany. During this time 
he returned to Berlin, revisited his 
childhood sites, began proceedings to 
reclaim family property confiscated by 
the Nazis, skied and fulfilled his teenage 
aspiration of romancing blond, German 
women. It is this last activity that 
occupies most of his autobiography, 
‘Nazis, Women, and Molecular Biology’ 
(1998), which seems written in large as 
an apology to these women.
Like several other pioneers of 
molecular biology, including Seymour 
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Gunther Stent, pioneer molecular 
biologist and neurobiologist, died in 
Haverford, Pennsylvania (USA) on June 
12, 2008, at the age of 84. He died in 
part as a result of bacterial pneumonia, 
an irony he might have appreciated 
as a founding member of the group of 
scientists who exploited Escherichia 
coli and bacteriophages to decipher 
the mechanisms of heredity at the 
molecular level, beginning in the 1940s.
Through his close intellectual, 
scientific and personal interactions 
with the principals of early molecular 
biology, his teaching, textbooks, critical 
essays and historical accounts, his 
philosophical lectures and writings, and, 
to a lesser extent, his own experiments, 
Stent helped establish the modern 
discipline of molecular biology. In 
the late 1960s, concluding that the 
major ‘paradoxes’ of this field had 
been resolved, he changed scientific 
directions, not once but twice, taking 
up first neurobiology and then the 
development of the leech. Among his 
numerous honors were his election to 
the American Philosophical Society, 
the American Academy of Arts and 
Sciences, and the National Academy of 
Sciences. Not bad for a Jewish refugee 
who later recounted his childhood 
humiliation at being excluded from the 
Hitler Youth in Nazi Germany.
Born Günter Siegmund Stensch on 
March 24, 1924 in Berlin, he was the 
youngest of three children. His parents, 
Georg and Elizabeth, were affluent, non-
observant and thoroughly assimilated 
Jews. The family name was changed to 
Stent upon emigration from Germany; 
Gunther anglicized his given name at 
the same time. His father’s business 
manufactured and sold bronze statuary 
and lighting fixtures. Following his 
mother’s struggle with depression and 
suicide when he was 10, Gunther was 
raised by his sister Claire. When the 
Nazis banned Jews from the public 
school system in 1935, Gunther was 
enrolled in a Jewish school (Private 
Waldschule Kaliski) which during 
its short existence produced three 
future Berkeley professors and other 
distinguished graduates. As the rising 
tide of anti-Semitism forced his family to 
Obituarynervous system is choosing highly valued options, a rational maneuver; 
but the valuation on the drug-
associated cues is pathologically high. 
So loosely, one might see this as a 
diminished will — a lowered capacity 
to choose behavioral options not 
leading to drugs, but resulting from 
bad valuations of cues associated with 
drugs. The mechanisms that make the 
choice conditioned on the valuation 
appear intact. So these approaches to 
addiction have given us a new way to 
conceptualize what might have been 
lazily labeled a ‘lack of will’ on the part 
of the addict. These computational 
models are growing in sophistication 
each year and are now being used 
to direct physiology experiments, 
neuroimaging experiments, and the 
assessment of various therapies in this 
domain.
There are other conditions that 
can also dramatically affect a 
person’s capacity to carry out normal 
value- dependent choice. Strokes, 
traumatic brain injury, coma, and 
various metabolic conditions can 
all influence one’s capacity to value 
behavioral acts and mental states, 
and so will compromise the ability to 
navigate a ‘normal’ life. Often family 
members or even the courts must step 
in and decide whether to turn off life 
support machinery, yet without any 
good understanding of what functions 
might need to recover for this ‘normal 
life’ to ensue nor how they might 
recover nor how to make measurements 
related to these unidentified functions. 
So we have a lot to learn in this domain, 
but this is exactly the arena where 
the best science needs to inform the 
decision- makers. I say inform here 
because even once the mechanistic 
answers are clearer, we will still have to 
choose what to do with them. 
How can I find out more? 
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